• The time set for the return of sovereignty and transfer of power to a legitimate Iraqi government is approaching and this fact makes the battle for the distribution of the levers of power ever fiercer.
• The economic and social grounds for the discontent and riots should be analyzed carefully. Many Iraqis have seen no benefits of the change, for they still live with the sense of insecurity. This is what provides ever more fertile soil for the radical and extremist ideas.
• The issue of preserving Iraq's integrity and controlling the "centrifugal"; ambitions of individual religious leaders and communities is acquiring ever greater urgency.

• Besides, I cannot pass over in silence some mistakes of the coalition leadership. In Kerbala, for example, the composition of the city council has created a lot of tension among the Shiites. The police and other security structures that were formed failed to be seen as a reliable partner.

1. A reinforced military presence is necessary. You may recall the efforts needed to ensure the second Polish battalion in the area of Kerbala. As I already said, today Poles and Bulgarians are fighting side by side. This is the key to the success of the Bulgarian and the Polish battalion at the moment. However, this proves inadequate in the face of the growing fierce resistance (the more realistic scenario). There must be a lasting solution to the question of the additional military presence. Not because our soldiers are under-trained as a western paper wrote about them these days! On the contrary, I think that with their professionalism and their courage our soldiers have set an example for many of our allies and our western partners. Besides, it is not for the Bulgarians that we claim reinforcement: the Bulgarians can protect themselves all right. What we claim is, first, adherence to the preliminary logistical plan of action that called for more than one battalion in Kerbala. Second, we urge the coalition to respond adequately to the radically changed situation. Any arrogance on the part of our partners is unacceptable, to put it mildly. For, indeed, our soldiers were among the few who could defend the symbols of power in Kerbala - the office of the mayor and the police department.

2. If necessary, limit the range of duties currently performed by the contingent, while focusing the efforts on defending the camp.

3. Step up preparations for the redeployment (outside Kerbala) of our battalion. As you have already heard, such an option is being considered. However I want it to be clear that this cannot be an end in itself. First, it must be an element of a joint ally strategy related to the handover of powers to the local population. Second, and more importantly, this cannot happen overnight. I for one would not recommend to our soldiers to be transferred from a fortified camp, as is the case at the moment, to a "green field"; figuratively speaking. Simply because the conditions necessary for their security have not been created there yet. But, of course, this is an issue for the military command to resolve, for they know best the situation on the spot. It is no good if we here issue prescriptions for action to our military command.

4. Urge the allies for additional military and technical support.

5. Continue work on overcoming problems in the co-ordination and communication among allies. I am saying this bluntly and I hasten to repeat something I mentioned a moment ago: we are gratified to note that recently the interaction has been improving. Hopefully this trend will continue in future.

6. I feel gratified that the Bulgarian diplomacy, albeit with a delay, has put on the table the idea I announced earlier this year, namely, of NATO's commitment in Iraq, and more specifically in the Polish area of responsibility. It is heartening that the idea is enjoying increasing support in the Alliance itself. I myself have raised the issue on many occasions, in all my meetings with heads of state and the NATO leadership, and I will continue to defend it. Even if this is to happen, it cannot happen before later this summer. The commitment of NATO would reinforce the Coalition presence and its power. Moreover, it would improve its organization. However it can hardly be expected to change the attitude of the Iraqi population. This is why it is significant to pursue other objectives as well:

7. Speed up the process of setting up the new Iraqi institutions, restoring sovereignty and transferring power to the Iraqi central and local authorities. These are the bodies, which, together with the Coalition partners and international organizations should ensure the development of the legitimate Iraqi institutions.

8. The UN must assume its active role in the construction of the new Iraqi state and nation. And the sooner this happens, the better! Bulgaria must contribute to the debate in the UN in such a way as to help reach a positive solution by adopting the relevant resolution. It will be hard, for the memory of the other type of stance we held in the Security Council is still vivid.

9. The most important condition for the lasting success of the Coalition forces in Iraq is to involve the majority of the local population in the pursuit of these goals. There can be no reconstruction or development in the context of such a severe confrontation (regardless of the way we describe it). The Coalition needs to rethink its concept of Iraq's development after Sadam. The Coalition must demonstrate unity, determination and power in the face of the extremists. It would be a mistake, however, if the Coalition command would believe that it can stem the violence and the spreading rebellion by military force alone.

In his fatva, the Great Ayatollah Ali as-Sistani called for "preventing the further chaos and bloodshed";. The question arises: "What is our (the Coalition's) adequate response to that appeal?"; I think that the contacts with the actual leaders should be activated immediately. The latter should be sought not only in critical situations whenever a fire is to be put out, as was the case of the recent days. They must be involved in a real dialogue and a consolidation of efforts for the building up of a new Iraq.

10. Last but not least, I shall recall my appeal to the National Assembly for a more proactive policy toward the Arab states and the Islamic world as a whole. The President's institution will honor its commitments in this respect.

The situation In Kerbala puts even more squarely another set of issues that I analyzed in the abovementioned address. This is mostly about the responsibility of the institutions for the security of both the state and its citizens. Our membership in NATO opens up new, broader vistas before us but it also lays on our shoulders a heavier burden of new responsibilities.

I will now touch upon a few other issues that call for early and effective steps.

On the strategic defense review

The Bulgarian armed forces have done a great deal for their own reformation and successful integration in the Euro-Atlantic Alliance. However, the global geopolitical and military strategic changes have been "pressing"; on the old forms of military construction, the ways and means of leading a defense policy.

The reform of the Bulgarian military and the entire defense system, not just the legislative framework, must continue with a thrust on the modernization and professionalization of our armed forces if we are to have a strong, flexible, well-trained and combat ready army.

This new stage of the reform of our armed forces should have a real (rather than declarative) and consistent political support. And I believe this is going to happen at one of the next meetings of the Advisory Council on National Security, as we have done on previous occasions.

A sizeable amount of expert work has gone into the Strategic Defense Review that has been underway for about a year now. A good document serves as a political framework for the Review, despite the delay in its voting. The partnership support of NATO experts is crucial in this respect. Yet, we should not forget that the Review is a Bulgarian project and the main responsibility for it lies with us.

Now, prior to the final discussions on the Strategic Defense Review, we must admit the actual danger that it may be deformed and reduced to yet another new plan for the organization of the Bulgarian armed forces.

Before ordering the reduction of combat units the Minister of Defense must tidy up his own house, that is, the Ministry. And this has not been the case. I do not think it is acceptable to insist on personnel and equipment cuts in the combat units, while overlapping bureaucratic structures, generating no military capabilities, maintain an inflated staff and budget.

I insist on a clear government and parliamentary commitment to keeping the defense spending on the adopted level of 2.6 per cent of GDP, whereby the economies made from quantitative reductions be used for improving the quality of our armed forces, the modernization of their equipment and the creation of new capabilities.

The continued adequate financing of the defense reform and the armed forces as a whole must be accompanied by a very strict control on spending in implementing the budget as well as on all operations of a financial and material nature.

Despite the intentions of a separate financing of our missions abroad declared on all levels we are nowhere near it and this fact is increasingly weighing on our military spending. There must be a solution taking into account the projected deficit but also a lasting future oriented position in the spirit of the stance taken by the Advisory Council for National Security, where we were unanimous.

We could have been spared some of the problems had the Review been preceded by and based on the annual Council of Ministers' reports to the National Assembly about the state of defense and the armed forces in line with Art. 32a of the Armed Forces Act. Such reports have not been submitted for more than two years now.

Work on the Strategic Review has revealed the great benefits of such a stock-taking of tasks, legislation, structures for the overall system of national security.

While speaking and insisting on the updating of the National Security Concept I mean not just identifying the need of resisting terrorism and organized crime but the emphasis on this task as a number one priority, which in turn calls for an adequate legislative, resource and personnel backup.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

The time between now and the beginning of 2007 will be crucial for the future of Bulgaria. This is a fact that nobody doubts. A dignified membership in the European Union, as well as proving ourselves as a reliable and dependable ally in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization will depend from now on our own performance, on the way we deliver at home rather than on the diplomatic negotiations. This means working on at least three levels:

1. Facing the problems on people's agenda, notably health and education, where, we must admit, we are rather distancing ourselves from the European standards;

2. This calls for a different approach to the agenda of the state, or mostly, "calling the spade a spade"; when the EU or NATO are concerned;

3. As to the parties' own agenda, it is clearly important for the overall better health of political life of the country. However, these problems should not be in the focus of the public debate.

This is the perspective from which I will comment a few topical issues, notably the constitutional amendments and the idea of a Grand National Assembly.

First of all, I would recall my view that the 1991 Constitution has provided a stable legislative and political framework for the transition to democracy and market economy. However, its significance is not restricted to the transition period. The Constitution has provided a set of reliable tools for addressing a number of problems, political crises included. Even today, the attitude to the Constitution is a criterion of a democratic mindset.

The Bulgarian Constitution of 1991 is a purposeful and successful attempt to establish in Bulgaria a constitutional democracy of a European type. It is a European constitution both in spirit and letter.

Ever since its adoption the Constitution has been fiercely criticized or even rejected. It has often served as the lightning rod focusing any criticisms about work poorly done by the politicians, about the warped way in which some constitutional provisions have been implemented. This makes me think that before we consider changing the Constitution we must learn to apply it properly.

The constitutional debate has been resurging, occasionally with a focus on a specific issue, or along the entire front of possible changes. In recent weeks the thrust of the discussions has been on the amendments called forth by our full European integration and on the way of making them - by a grand or an ordinary National Assembly.

Unfortunately this clearly necessary debate gets bogged down in the reproduction of more than fifty other proposals concerning mostly the structure of the state and the form of state government. This is why I believe that it is necessary to structure this debate clearly, which is not the case at the moment.

Two sets of issues could be identified here:

1. Changes related to Bulgaria's membership in the EU.

Such changes are undoubtedly needed. Can these changes be made by an ordinary National Assembly? The constitutional experts' answer is overwhelmingly positive, that is, it is believed that the present membership of the National Assembly can do the job.

I go along with this view while I continue to hold that the Constitutional Court alone can weigh the force of the arguments. If the knot cannot be unraveled in the presence of so many contradicting views, then it must be cut. I reiterate my readiness to seize the Constitutional Court with an in-depth query after the end of ongoing discussions and consultations. This may happen by the end of this week or the next.

2. The Grand National Assembly typically assumes the role of a constituent power, and persistent calls for convening it raise the question: "Are we out to re-constitute our state?"; Do we want to re-write the Republic's public covenant?

I find irrelevant the convocation of a Grand Parliament only for the sake of its own self-dissolution. There have been such ideas. Incidentally, they have triggered off the debate. I am for preserving the Grand National Assembly which, in the sense put into it by the authors of the Constitution, can and should act as a barrier against any temporary ambitions for changes of the state structure and form of government, such as a waver of the democratic constitutional principles of people's sovereignty, the separation of powers, political pluralism, as well as the basic human and citizens' rights.

I for one believe that it is good to have in our Constitution what is known as "unchangeable provisions"; along the lines of what they have in some classical democracies (USA, Germany, France or Italy). A case in point is the republican nature of the state which should not be subject to changes. Since the authors of the Constitution have not endorsed this principle, at least the Grand National Assembly should stay on as a minimum guarantee, as the heavy and unwieldy mechanism of changes whenever the form of state government is concerned.

It must be clear that we do need what is called "safeguard democracy"; that contains guarantees against adventurous and undemocratic experiments of one majority or another...

Next, we need to reach an accord on those constitutional amendments that are to make the judiciary more effective and help complete the judicial reform. No one to date has made a sound case for the need of structural changes in the judiciary that proceed from the commitments the state has made in its negotiations with the EU. In a dialogue with the judiciary, the politicians should highlight those constitutional provisions that could be changed at once and are to improve the work of magistrates and hence, the legal safety of the Bulgarian citizens.

A number of possible amendments have emerged from my discussions with representatives of the court, the prosecution and investigation, amendments that the present National Assembly could pass stepping upon the consensus already built. It is high time that we finalize the judicial reform, rather than having each majority take it up from scratch and denying everything done before that.

While I tread carefully on the legal aspects of the problem, leaving the last word to the constitutionalists I shall be categorical enough on the political dimensions of the idea to convene a Grand National Assembly.

This may turn out to be a wasted year, and, mind you, this is the most important year prior to our EU accession. This will be a time of implementing the agreements reached in our negotiations with the EU. It must be clear to us that even with the proviso that the Grand National Assembly will limit its work to the problems proceeding from our European integration, this cannot be presumed. The opposite is more likely. It is good to remember that the constitutional texts are so mutually intertwined that once you start pulling at a string it would be hard to foresee where the process could end.

It is highly probable that we may drift toward a very broad constitutional debate that could revive and bring out onstage all well know conflicts from the dawn of the transition. Effectively, this could restart the transition. If we cave in to the calls for a revision rather than for changes, we shall be facing the real threat of disrupting the constitutional model that has proved its effectiveness.

What happens, if the Grand National Assembly blocks itself and fails to do the job it is elected for (the currently declared positions on the possible themes for the Grand National Assembly are disparate without an inkling of compatibility or even convergence). Could this not lead to an even worse compromise of parliamentarism, or the political class?

What we need is stability in the changes. From this perspective I shall comment on a small fraction of the ideas floated by both politicians and experts:

• Once again I shall argue against the idea of reducing the number of MPs. Apparently, this is the cheaper option, provided that the money is not spent on a second chamber, as some suggest. It must be clear that the smaller number of seats in parliament will automatically raise the election threshold, thus bringing the number of represented political parties to two, maximum three, effectively reproducing the bipolar model.

• I would support the trend of increasing the powers of the local authorities as there is a disparity now between the rights and responsibilities of the centre and the local bodies of self-government. I cannot accept, though, some extreme claims for exceedingly great powers for the local authorities that effectively lean toward federalization, a trend that is incompatible with the unitary tradition of the Bulgarian state structure.

• Another thesis has emerged in the course of the political debate: that of convening a Grand National Assembly on the occasion of our European integration, however with the idea of including the balance of institutional powers in its agenda. This is a subject that invites both a debate and new solutions. In a future debate on this issue I shall defend my views about a better working balance, with greater presidential powers (I have substantiated similar ideas before); about the majority necessary for overruling the presidential veto; the right of the head of state to call a referendum directly (without a passage through parliament).

In such a discussion other related matters may arise. I am not raising them for I believe that our nation cannot afford the luxury of dealing with such problems up to our accession to the EU.

This is why I call on the majority to see its responsibility for the tasks we are facing at this stage and to do what is necessary to drop from the political debate the issue of the Grand National Assembly in the period leading up to membership.

If, nonetheless, there will be enough votes for a Grand National Assembly insofar as the Constitution provides for it, and not only for this reason, I shall be playing a major part in drafting the agenda, as well as in the political and public debate on the issue.